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This paper analyses the innovation process of music goods from an organisational point of view and 
the effects of digital technology on the allocation of property rights. 
 
We apply the property rights theory framework introduced by Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) to the 
music industry and study the contractual relationship between artists who create music and labels who 
promote and distribute it. 
 
In the spirit of GHM, different types of ownership structures are analysed.  The result confirms the 
current allocation of property rights as it suggests that music labels, whose role in the production 
process is indispensable due to their promotion and distribution knowledge, should own the copyright. 
 
However as digital technology advances further, alternative ways to promote and distribute music 
develop  – labels become less indispensable.  We find scenarios where the incumbent ownership 
structure ceases to be optimal. 
 
Moreover, we discuss new organisational structures of the music industry.  We introduce a mentor, an 
alternative intermediary to the label and analyse its effect on the optimal allocation of ownership.  Our 
main result is that label ownership becomes less likely. 
 
 
Keywords: property rights theory, copyright, internet, music industry 
 
JEL Classification: C71, D23, L23, L82, L86 
 
Acknowledgements   
We thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding this research.  We would like to thank seminar audiences at 
Bristol, SERCI congress 2002 in Madrid, Kiel Institute for World Economics, IIOC 2003 in Boston, 
2003 BERLECON workshop on IT in Berlin and EARIE 2003 in Helsinki. 
 




 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The impact of new information technologies is a hot topic in economics and
business. In particular the ￿eld of digital content is in the spotlight. This paper
analyses the consequences of the recent advances in information processing and
transmission for the ownership of copyright in the music industry. Our model
is based on the property rights theory of the ￿rm introduced by Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Moreover, we build on features of
Aghion and Tirole (1994) in analyzing the ownership of innovation rather than
physical assets.
We study the innovation process of music goods from an organizational point
of view. Artists who create music and record labels who promote and distribute
it are identi￿ed as the agents. They can invest eﬀort or resources (writing songs
and creating a promotion campaign, for instance) to improve the product. The
outcome of their combined work (a song or album) is not predictable at the time
they form the relationship. Therefore the exact nature of the piece of music is
ill-de￿ned ex ante. The contract between the artist and the label cannot specify
the innovation itself but can only allocate the property rights of the innovation
(the copyright).
We build on the detailed case study Regner (2003) of the music industry
and formalize and extend its approach. The two most essential business areas ￿
marketing and distribution ￿ are related to one of the relevant parameters of the
property rights model: the relative indispensability of the agents. The results of
the model application are in line with the incumbent ownership structure since
they predict copyright of songs to be owned by the labels. However, based on
t h ea n a l y s i sw ec o n j e c t u r eag r a d u a ld e c r e a s eo ft h el a b e l ￿ sp o w e rb e c a u s eo f
technological change and its impact on the industry, and therefore a change in
the allocation of property rights.
This change is, however, conditional on the actual artist type. We also intro-
duce a third agent (a mentor, M)w h oo ﬀers an alternative exposure channel to
newcomer artists. The motivation for this extension stems from the increasing
need for new intermediaries in digital content.
We analyze when the mentor adds value and study the eﬀect on the optimal
ownership structure with three agents. M would assume the role of a venture
capitalist if him owning the copyright were optimal. We analyze non-drastic
technology change where the label is not replaced entirely.
In the case of non-drastic technology change adding the third agent increases
value unambiguously when the mentor￿s and the label￿s investments are additive.
When the investments are complementary the mentor obtains holdup power
over the label￿s investment and the holdup problem is increased by adding the
third agent. If the value of M￿s investment is high enough it outweighs the
1lower incentives for the artist and the label and the alternative intermediary
adds value. The label is less likely to own the copyright because the relative
importance of investments and the bargaining payoﬀs change in favour of the
artist and the mentor.
Among other things this paper brings together features from Hart and Moore
(1990) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). Hart and Moore (1990) analyze the
optimal ownership structure with a ￿x e dn u m b e ro fa g e n t s . T h ed e g r e eo f
indispensability of the agents is one of the important determinants of the op-
timal ownership structure. They do not endogenize the number of agents and
they analyze only complementary investments. Rajan and Zingales (1998) do
endogenize the number of agents and also analyze diﬀerent investment types.
However, ownership is exogenous in their model and only the intermediaries
￿ not the owner ￿ invest. Our paper endogenizes the number of agents and
the ownership structure. All agents invest and we analyze diﬀerent investment
types applying it to the music industry.
It is also worth to mention that diﬀerent bargaining approaches within prop-
erty rights theory deliver the same results in the context of our paper. De Meza
and Lockwood (1998) point out that in non-cooperative bargaining ownership
may demotivate in contrast to the cooperative bargaining of Grossman-Hart-
Moore (GHM) that is applied here. However, taking into account investment
spillovers the two approaches are found to be not so diﬀerent after all. These
cross eﬀects augment the value of the asset, the investment remains in the asset
even if the agent leaves and it can be appropriated by the owner. With large
enough cross eﬀe c t so w n e r s h i pd o e sm o t i v a t ea si ti ss h o w ni nd eM e z aa n d
Lockwood (2003). In the context of the music industry, investments of artists
and labels clearly do have spillovers since they directly improve the quality of
the innovation as described earlier. Owning the innovation ￿ having the copy-
right ￿ motivates. The degree of cross eﬀects is expressed by the indispensability
￿ the (in-)ability to make use of the remaining investment without the agent.
The economic literature on copyright is well summarized in Watt (2000).
However, in the existing literature the owner of copyright is taken as given. Only
the relationship between the copyright holder and the consumer is analyzed.
Whereas we distinguish between artist and label ownership analyzing which is
more eﬃcient in the context of technological change.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We give some background and
motivation in section 2 and describe the benchmark model with two agents in
section 3. Section 4 analyses the emergence of an alternative intermediary. The
optimal allocation of ownership - given three agents - is studied in section 5 and
section 6 concludes.
22 Digital Technology in the Music Industry
T h ep r o p e r t yr i g h t st h e o r yo ft h e￿rm is a very useful framework to understand
the ownership structure in the music market.1 In the detailed case study of the
music industry in Regner (2003) the two most essential business areas of the
industry (distribution and marketing) are analyzed and related to the property
rights theory. Recent changes in information technology culminating in peer-
to-peer ￿le sharing software like Napster are studied in order to clarify their
impact on the industry structure and its optimal allocation of ownership.
The main ￿ndings in the traditional music market (pre-Napster) are a label
dominated retail distribution network without viable alternative and generally
more eﬃcient marketing potential for the labels. We assume the artist to be of
a singer/songwriter type. He composes the songs and also plays and performs
them. Thus, he provides all the artistic input.2 The standard model with an
artist and a label explains the allocation of ownership in the traditional music
industry where labels own the copyright of songs. This is shown to be optimal.
However, the model suggests a change in the ownership structure due to the pos-
sibilities digital technology oﬀers to the artists. In the post-Napster scenario the
labels are getting more dispensable as their retail distribution network becomes
replaceable due to alternative ways of electronic distribution. The artists are
able to promote their products more eﬃciently themselves (with digital updates
of their existing fan base or through the information externalities of ￿le sharing
networks). Depending on the artist type and the exact eﬀect of technology a
move towards artist ownership appears predictable.
Now we distinguish between established artists and newcomers. The former
can address their existing fan base directly. They would presumably cooperate
with intermediaries for the various tasks internet-based marketing and distrib-
ution require.3 These services are not particular and the alternative interme-
diaries (who might even be the old ones if the labels restructure and refocus
their business concept) can be replaced on the spot market rather easily. Since
we can fairly assume that the established artists do command over substantial
funds, they will not encounter diﬃculties in compensating the labels in order to
realize the ownership change.4
Less known artists bene￿t from the information externalities created by
peer-to-peer networks.5 However, they still have to compete for attention in
1It has also been adopted by Caves (2000) and Caves (2003) to analyze the music industry
in particular and creative industries in general.
2In the conclusions we elaborate on the results if this assumption is lifted.
3Web services like the design and maintenance of a web site or running an online shop for
CD sales, promotion services (a concert agency), art design of booklet and cover.
4The artist ￿Prince￿ can be seen as an early precursor. He became exceptionally popular
in the early 90s, but feuded with his record company in the middle of a long-term contract. He
reluctantly ful￿lled the deal only to produce his latest album with a label he founded himself.
However, his motives might not be purely based on a monetary gain, but simply because of
antipathy towards music labels.
5The reason for this are network eﬀects. It is formally explained in Duchene and Waelbroeck
(2003).
3a seemingly abundant ￿eld of new artists who are all able to utilize these infor-
mation transmission channels. Intermediaries might oﬀer new valuable services
for unknown artists targeting their ￿need for attention￿ in the networked world.
Moreover, the new artists cannot simply buy out labels to get ownership even
if this would provide better overall investment incentives, because they do not
have the ￿nancial means. An ineﬃcient allocation of ownership would result.
Our model is inspired by this demand for new intermediaries in digital con-
tent who can address the need for attention and who can provide newcomer
artists with ￿nancial resources.
Established, famous artists with some sort of entrepreneurial spirit (to invest
their money) and faith in the success of the newcomer (to credibly promote
them with their own reputation) have the ￿capital￿ to provide new artists in
the post-Napster scenario with an alternative to label promotion. They would
function like a mentor, adopting a young artist they particularly like or one who
they regard as very promising. Obviously, the established artist would pick a
newcomer of his own artistic ￿eld who he can credibly recommend and promote.
He would support him by linking to the newcomer web site from his own well-
visited web site and endorsing him there or by taking him to concert tours
to perform before the main concert etc. Generally, he would act as a venture
capitalist who believes in, promotes and ￿nances the project of the newcomer.
Some aspects of this mentoring are analyzed in the following model. We will
strictly focus on his role as an information intermediary promoting the new
artist, leaving the ￿nancing part for later analysis.
3 The benchmark
3.1 The model
Our benchmark is a simpli￿ed version of Hart and Moore (1990) applied to the
music industry. Like Aghion and Tirole (1994) we focus on the ownership of
innovation rather than physical assets. There are two agents in the model: the
artist, A, and the label, L. A composes and performs a piece of music, the
innovation. L is needed to produce, promote and distribute the piece of music ￿
the CD ￿ to the ￿nal consumers. Our focus is on the question who should own
the innovation, i.e. whether the artist or the label should have the copyright.
At the time A and L form the relationship the nature of the innovation is
ill-de￿ned: the song is yet to be composed. Therefore they cannot contract
for the delivery of a speci￿c innovation. Only an already composed song can
be described fully. The agents can, however, contract on the ownership of the
innovation, the copyright. If L has the ownership, the copyright of any song
composed by A during the relationship belongs to L. While if A holds the
property rights, he himself owns the copyright of his song.
Ownership of the copyright is the only instrument analyzed in this paper.
We do not analyze royalties ￿ contracts that reward A according to the number
of CDs sold. This is because there are many ways the label can conceal the true
4number of CDs sold. Krasilovsky and Shemel (2000, p. 21-22) report that the
exact sales are diluted by promotional give aways and record clubs. Moreover,
recording costs are recouped by the labels against the artist￿s royalties. Pro￿t
sharing contracts are also problematic, because the labels have many artists
working for them and the aggregate pro￿t level does not accurately re￿ect the
contribution of an individual artist.6 Our focus on ownership alone is in line
with the property rights theory.
Both agents can improve the value of the innovation by investment. The
artist engages in the creative process of composing songs, practising and record-
ing them. The label spends resources for the recording. It also invests in
preliminary promotion. A￿s investment is denoted by iA and L￿s investment by
iL. The investments are speci￿c to this very relationship. The artist￿s eﬀort of
creating a song is completely linked to the actual copyright of the work, which
means that his investment is entirely relationship-speci￿c. The label needs to
plan a promotion campaign before the release of the CD. Moreover, it also
has to allocate recording and video production resources for the artist. These
investments are also relationship-speci￿c.
The minimum level of investment is normalized to be 0. This level already
contains basic eﬀort out of artistic curiosity, willingness to express and fun.7 The
investments are observable to A and L, but they are not veri￿able to others.
The value of production, the revenue from the CD, depends on both agent￿s
investments and is given by v(iA,i L). We assume that the agents have equally
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Assumption 1 is standard and guarantees an interior solution.
The timing of the model is the following. At date 0 the agents contract on the
ownership of the innovation; either A or L has the ownership of the copyright.
Then the agents simultaneously choose their relationship-speci￿c investments.
At date 1 the spot contract on trade is written. Then the ￿nal version of the
album is recorded and sold and the revenues are shared according to the spot
contract. Also the promotion campaign, concert tours and other promotional
acts with the artist take place.
6Even if the time 1 revenues were veri￿able, agreements to share pro￿ts are of limited
value since the agents can always threaten to provide a bad product (low quality recording
and concerts, lacklustre promotion) or not to trade at all. (See Hart and Moore (1990) footnote
7.)
7See also Aghion and Tirole￿s (1994) concept of researchers￿ intellectual curiosity.
8We make this assumption to simplify the analysis. See Regner (2003) for the analysis of
am o d e lw h e r eA and L diﬀer in the importance of investments.
5If under L-ownership the relationship were to break at date 1 ￿ after the
innovation is realized ￿ L could produce and sell the CD without A￿s contribu-
tion. That is, another artist would perform the song in the ￿nal recording and
give concerts to promote the product. The value of the innovation without A￿s
contribution is denoted by v(iL;λA) and the value depends on how indispens-
able A is. Parameter λA, where 0 ≤ λA ≤ 1, is the degree of indispensability
of A.F o rλA =0 , A is completely indispensable. Then the marginal return to
L￿s investment without A is zero: ∂v(iL;λA =0 ) /∂iL =0 . For λA =1 , A is
fully dispensable and the marginal return to L￿s investment is not aﬀected by
whether A is in the coalition or not: ∂v(iL;λA =1 ) /∂iL = ∂v(iA,i L)/∂iL. If
the agents split under L-ownership A does not have any rights to the song he
has composed and therefore he earns zero utility.
If the agents split under A-ownership, A can sell the song to the customers,
but now without L promoting and distributing the product. The value of pro-
duction is then v(iA;λL) and as above, the marginal return to A￿s investment
depends on how indispensable L is, while L can only earn zero utility.
Assumption 2.
∂v(ii;λj)




∂ii if λj =1 .
∂2v(ii;λj)
∂ii∂λj > 0 where i,j = A,L and i 6= j.
Assumption 3. v(iA;λL) ≤ v(iA,i L) and v(iL;λA) ≤ v(iA,i L).
Assumption 2 de￿nes that the marginal value of agent i￿s investment is
increasing in λj. The more dispensable the non-owning agent is, the higher is
the marginal value of the owner￿s investment when he works alone. Assumption
3i m p l i e st h a ti ti se xp o s te ﬃcient for the agents to produce together rather
than split.
3.2 Results













Since date 0 contracts can be written only on ownership, the bargaining
takes place after the investments are sunk. The agents foresee that part of the
surplus they generate is expropriated in the bargaining process, while they pay
the full cost of this investment. This leads to the hold up problem. Ownership
of the copyright is allocated to minimize the holdups.














v(iL;λA) − c(iA) (3)
Diﬀerentiating these Nash bargaining payoﬀs with respect to iL and iA yields






















We denote L￿s optimal investment given by equation (4) by iL(λA) and A￿s
optimal investment given by equation (5) by iA(0). Comparing the incentives
to the ￿rst best investments (equation (1)) we see that both agents underinvest
(unless λA =1 ). Assumption 2 implies that iL is increasing in λA. Owning
the copyright provides the better incentives to invest for the label the more
dispensable the artist is. The artist is subject to a signi￿cant holdup.






















Ownership improves A￿s incentives, but only at the expense of weakening L￿s
incentives.
Joint surplus under L-ownership is:
SL = v(iA(0),i L(λA)) − c(iA(0)) − c(iL(λA)) (8)
and under A-ownership:
SA = v(iA(λL),i L(0)) − c(iA(λL)) − c(iL(0)). (9)
Label ownership is optimal if and only if SL ≥ SA.
Remember that we have assumed that v(iA,i L) is symmetric in iA and iL.
From equations (5) and (6) we can see that iA(0) = iL(0). Furthermore, by As-
sumption 2 we know that iL(λA) <i A(λL) if and only if λA <λ L. Therefore,
the optimal ownership structure depends solely on the relative dispensability of
the agents. A-ownership is optimal if and only if λA <λ L. When the agents
diﬀer merely in their degree of indispensability, it is optimal that the less re-
placeable agent to own the innovation. This is because the most indispensable
agent has the potential for the greatest holdup power as a non-owning agent.
To avoid that it is better to give him the ownership.
7We can now relate the results of the benchmark model to the impact of
information technology in the music market. The new technology makes the
labels more dispensable, because music can be distributed also electronically,
not only through the labels￿ retail system. In the terminology of our model λL
increases and a higher λL makes A-ownership more likely. The prediction of
our benchmark model is that copyrights are likely to shift from the labels to
the artists. While in the traditional music industry the relative indispensability
was in favour of the labels (λA >λ L), optimal ownership will change from L to
A when the technology change is large enough so that λL >λ A.
However, we ought to distinguish between established artists and newcomers.
As new artists may be cash-constrained they cannot compensate the labels to
get ownership.9 Even though A-ownership might be more eﬃcient, the labels
would still own the copyright. The new artist case can lead to an ineﬃcient
ownership structure.
4 New intermediary
The technology change also opens up a role for new intermediaries. In this
section we introduce an alternative way to promote music: mentoring. An
experienced, well-known artist promotes the product of a newcomer. We analyze
whether the new intermediary adds value when the artist owns the copyright. In
Section 5 we examine the implications of the new intermediary on the optimal
allocation of ownership.
We have three agents: the artist, A, and the intermediaries (the label, L,
and the mentor, M). Two types of production functions are considered. Firstly,
investments are additive in our terminology when:
v(iA,i L,i M)=f(iA,i L)+g(iA,i M)
The value function is additively separable in L￿s and M￿s investment. While
with complementary investments higher investment by an intermediary increases




Both additive and complementary investments describe a situation where the
technology change is non-drastic. It opens up new possibilities for marketing
(mentoring), but does not replace the incumbent label altogether.
In order to solve the three player bargaining process between A, L and M
we use the Shapley value. The Shapley value for agent j is:
9In the next section we introduce a mentor for the new artist. One possible way to interpret
the mentor￿s investment is cash which makes artist ownership feasible.
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(v(ij,i k,i l) − v(ik,i l)) +
1
6
(v(ij,i k) − v(ik)) +
1
6




j,k,l = A,L,M, j 6= k 6= l
Here the agents included in the coalition are denoted by their investments
in the value function. E.g. v(iA,i M) denotes the value A and M can pro-
duce together without L￿s contribution. Naturally, we assume that a coalition
generates revenue only if one of their agents owns the copyright. Therefore
v(iL,i M)=v(iL)=v(iM)=0when A has the copyright.
We analyze two diﬀerent ways for the new intermediary to enter the produc-
tion process when the technology change is non-drastic. The new intermediary
either replaces the incumbent in one of his tasks (alternative 1) or introduces
an e ww a yt op r o m o t eA￿s creation making the project larger (alternative 2).
The reality lies between these two extremes. In what follows we modify the
benchmark model of Section 3 to take the two alternatives into account.
In alternative 1 L has two tasks in the benchmark case (one way to see this is
to adapt the focus of Regner (2003) and assign distribution and marketing as the
tasks)and M takes over one of them. For example, when M starts promoting
the artist, L concentrates on distributing the product. The value of production








L are L￿s investments in the



































− 1=0 for j =1 ,2 (11)
When M takes over task 2 from L the value of production becomes v(iA,i L,i M).
M￿s investment may be more productive than an equivalent investment by L.
We capture this eﬀect by replacing the production function v(iA,i L,i M) by
v(iA,i L,ωi M) where ω ≥ 1.10
With additive investments L￿s two tasks are independent and we can split























































10We do not analyze ω<1 as it cannot be value increasing to include a less productive















− 1= 0 (14)
In alternative 2 the project becomes larger when M joins in. L continues
to provide conventional label marketing and M contributes as an information
intermediary. For example M takes A to concert tours to perform before the
main concert and endorses him on his web portal. Introducing the new inter-
mediary changes the production function from v(iA,i L) to V (iA,i L,i M). For
iM > 0 and for given investments iA and iL v(iA,i L) <V(iA,i L,i M) implying
that the larger project is more valuable.
With additive investments we can again split up the production value:
V (iA,i L,i M)=v(iA,i L)+w(iA,i M).
A￿s and L￿s incentives in the benchmark for both additive and complemen-
tary investments are as in equations (6) and (7).











,w (iA,i M) and V (iA,i L,i M).
4.1 New intermediary takes over one task from incumbent
4.1.1 Additive investments
In alternative 1 M takes over task 2 from L, while L continues to perform
task 1. The value of production with additive investments is v(iA,i L,ωi M)=






























[v(iA,i L,ωi M) − v (iA,ωi M;λL)] +
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g(iA;λM) − iM (17)
Remember that a coalition without the artist produces zero value since he holds
the copyright. The value function is separable in L￿s and M￿s investments and
therefore the bargaining outcome is as if A negotiates independently with each










































Proposition 1 follows directly from comparing equations (12) - (14) to (18)
- (20).
Proposition 1 If investments are additive and the new agent takes over one
task from the incumbent, the value of production remains unchanged if and only
if ω =1and λM = λL. The new agent increases value if (i) ω>1 or (ii)
λM >λ L. Allowing the third agent to join the production is never harmful.
Proof. It is straightforward from equations (12) - (14) and (18) - (20) that
the incentives are the same in the two-agent and the three-agent cases if and
only if ω =1and λM = λL. If ω>1, A￿s incentives are greater in the 3-agent
case and M has higher incentives than L for the second task. If λM >λ L A
has improved incentives in the 3-agent case. λM cannot be smaller than λL as
in replacing M in production A can use the same spot market alternative as
in replacing L in the 2-agent case or alternatively go back to using L for task
2. Furthermore, ω ≥ 1 by assumption. Therefore, adding the third agent can
never lower the investments.
If L and M are equally productive (ω =1 )and equally replaceable in task
2 (λM = λL),Mtaking over one task from L has no eﬀect on the value of pro-
duction. Because of the separability of the production function the bargaining
outcome is as if A negotiates independently with each intermediary. When L
and M are identical in task 2, the bargaining outcome is the same as in the
two agent case11. Therefore, the incentives are the same too and the value of
production remains unchanged when M joins in.
If M￿s investment in task 2 is more productive than L￿s, then including M in
the coalition unambiguously increases the value of production. This is because
the bargaining outcome is not aﬀe c t e db yt h et h i r da g e n t . A l s oi fM is more
dispensable than L it is bene￿cial to allow M to join the production. This may
simply result from the fact that A has the option of going back to L to perform
task 2.
With additive investments it is therefore never value decreasing to introduce
the new agent.
11Apart from the fact that M rather than L is getting half of the surplus from task 2.
114.1.2 Complementary investments


















































The incentives are clearly lower than in the benchmark for ω =1and λL,λ M < 1
(compare to equations (10) and (11)).
When the investments are complementary the new intermediary obtains
holdup power over the artist￿s and the incumbent agent￿s investments. Un-
like in the additive case the marginal value of A￿s and L￿s investments depends
o nw h e t h e ro rn o tM is in the coalition. Introducing the third agent increases
the power problems and the incentives are weaker even if M￿s investment is as
productive as L￿s.
On the other hand M￿s investment can be more productive than L￿s. For ω
high enough the bene￿t of introducing a more productive agent to the coalition
outweighs the cost of higher holdup problems as the following Proposition shows.
Proposition 2 If investments are complementary and the new agent takes over
one task from the incumbent, permitting the third agent to join under A-ownership
is optimal if and only if ω>b ω.
Proof. For ω =1and λL = λM < 1 it is clear from equations (10),(11)
and (??) ￿ (23) that the 2-agent case dominates. However, for ω →∞the 3-
agent case dominates. Further v(iA,i L,ωi M) is monotonically increasing in ω.
Therefore, there exists b ω for which the joint surplus in the 2-agent case equals
the joint surplus in the 3-agent case. The 3-agent case dominates if and only if
ω>b ω.
4.2 New intermediary creates a new task
4.2.1 Additive investments
We now analyze the case when the new intermediary creates a new task and
makes the project larger. When the investments of the label and the mentor are









































A gets benchmark incentives from his production part with L (equation (7)) and
additionally he also has incentives for his production part with M.T h e r e f o r e ,
A￿s investment is higher than in the benchmark. The ￿rst-order condition for
L is equivalent to the benchmark (equation (6)), but since A￿s investment is
higher than in the benchmark also L￿s incentives are improved at the margin.
This is due to the complementary eﬀect of M￿s investment. Moreover, now
the third agent (under)invests as well in the new task. Total surplus therefore
unambiguously increases.
Proposition 3 If investments are additive and the new agent creates a new
task, the three agent case generates more value than the two agent case under
A-ownership. Allowing the third agent to join the production is optimal.
Proof. By comparing equation (7) and (24) it is clear that A￿s investment
is higher with three agents. Equations (6) and (25) are equivalent, but L￿s
investment is higher in the 3-agent case, because
∂2v(iA,iL)
∂iA∂iL > 0. Additionally,
M invests in the new task and therefore surplus is unambiguously higher in the
3-agent case.
When investments are additive, power problems are not increased by the
new agent because the bargaining outcome is as if A bargains separately with L
and M. Therefore, there are no costs, only bene￿ts from the new intermediary
who creates a new task. It is optimal to allow him to join in.
4.2.2 Complementary investments


















































Power problems increase with complementary investments since the bar-
gaining is now between three rather than two agents. This tends to lower the
incentives for A and L. On the other hand M￿s new contribution increases the
marginal returns for A￿s and L￿s investment (due to the complementary eﬀect)
which increases their incentives. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether A and L
have lower or higher incentives in the three agent case.
Since M increases the size of the project by de￿nition, M￿s investment in-
creases the surplus in the three agent case. If additionally A￿s and L￿s incentives
are higher in the three agent case, permitting the third agent to join is optimal.
While if A￿s and L￿s incentives are lower in the three agent case, we need to
weigh their lower investments with M￿s higher investment to ￿nd whether it is
optimal to allow M to join in. The following Proposition summarizes our results
in this case.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the function V (iA,i L,i M) is replaced by V (iA,i L,ωi M)
where ω ≥ 0. If investments are complementary and M creates a new task, per-
mitting the third agent to join is optimal if (i)
∂2V (iA,iL,ωiM)
∂ij∂iM >> 0 for j = A,L
or (ii) ω>e ω. Restricting production to two agents is optimal if ω → 0.
Proof. Comparing equations (6) and (7) to (27) and (28) we see that A and
L have higher incentives in the 3-agent case if
∂2V (iA,iL,ωiM)
∂ij∂iM >> 0 for j = A,L.
Then the 3-agent case dominates since there is additionally M￿s investment.
Even if A￿s and L￿s incentives are worse, if the value of M￿s investment is very
large, the 3-agent case dominates. This is the case when ω is very high (ω>e ω).
Instead, if ω → 0 the value of M￿s investment is negligible and clearly the
2-agent case dominates.
Proposition 4 shows that the value of the new intermediary depends on the
value of his investment and on the eﬀect of his investment on the marginal re-
turns of the existing agents. The new intermediary always obtains some holdup
power when investments are complementary. But when he has a valuable in-
vestment which increases the project￿s value directly and indirectly via making
the existing agents￿ investments more productive at the margin, it is bene￿-
cial to join forces with the new intermediary. While if his investment is of low
value and has not much complementary eﬀects to the existing agents, the new
intermediary only introduces power problems and it is better to restrict the
production to two agents.
4.3 Summary
In this section we have analyzed the impact of a new intermediary ￿ the mentor
￿ on the value of production. Given artist ownership we have studied, whether
14it is bene￿cial to let M join under diﬀerent investment types (additive or com-
plementary) and diﬀerent ways of cooperation (M creates a new task or he
takes over an existing one from L). We have shown that a third agent gener-
ally improves the value of production. However, if the mentor￿s and the label￿s
investments are complementary, the mentor has to be suﬃciently productive,
because he obtains holdup power over the label and the artist. We determine
parameter values for M￿s eﬃciency of ω>e ω in alternative 1 and ω>b ω in
alternative 2 for this to be true. If these two conditions hold, letting the new
intermediary join is bene￿cial in all four cases.
This leads to the question of what ownership structure is optimal when there
are three agents taking part in production. That is the focus of Section 5: can
the joint surplus be further increased by allocating the ownership from A to
one of the intermediaries? If it is not optimal for M to join the production, the
benchmark analysis of Section 3 determines the owner of the copyright.
Notice that it is not necessary to repeat the analysis of this section for other
ownership structures. For example suppose A-ownership is optimal in the two-




i denotes joint surplus with n agents when i has the copyright. Then if







it implies that S2
A <S 3
M. In other words, allowing the third agent to join is
optimal also when taking into account that ownership may change.
Finally, we compare our results brie￿y to Rajan and Zingales (1998). In their
paper an entrepreneur E owns the asset, but he does not invest. Instead, the
managers M1 and M2 invest and the question is how many managers should
be granted access to maximize pro￿t. Their de￿nition of additive investments is





and M1￿s investment aﬀects M2￿s investment due to the function￿s
concavity. Therefore, the individual investment level of the managers is reduced,
but total investment is larger than if one had been given access. However, the
collective net payoﬀ of two managers is lower than a single manager would get
and therefore E grants access to two managers. When they assume complemen-
tary investments access granted to two managers leads to a lower investment
level than if only one manager had access because of the greater holdup power.
Due to the assumption of one manager being able to invest in both tasks, the
entrepreneur should allow access to only one manager.
5 Optimal allocation of ownership
In this section we relax the assumption that A owns the copyright and analyze
the optimal allocation of ownership.
In the two agent environment of Section 3 the optimal ownership structure
merely depended on which agent ￿ A or L ￿ is more indispensable. Artist
ownership was optimal if and only if λA <λ L. We now ￿nd out whether in
t h et h r e ea g e n te n v i r o n m e n tt h es a m er e s u l th o l d s .T h e r e f o r e ,w ec o m p a r et h e
15incentives under A-ownership examined in Section 4 to the incentives when one
of the intermediaries owns.
5.1 New intermediary takes over one task from incumbent
5.1.1 Complementary investments
We start the analysis this time from the complementary investments as that
is the simpler case. If one of the intermediaries ￿ let us assume L ￿o w n st h e


















































Remember that a coalition without L, the copyright holder, produces zero value.
We have assumed that in the benchmark A and L have equally important










2 ) for any i0
A and i0
L.T h e n M
taking over task 2 from L will make A￿s investment relatively more important
than L￿s investment. Furthermore, A￿s investment is also more important than
M￿s investment as long as M is not signi￿cantly more productive in task 2 than
L (ω<2). We need to account for these factors when analyzing the optimal
ownership structure. It is the changes in the relative importance of investments
that will alter the results on the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 5 If the investments are complementary, the introduction of a new
intermediary who takes over one task from L makes L-ownership less likely.
Proof. Suppose that λA = λL = λM. We analyze this case to demonstrate
how the relative importance of investments alone aﬀects the optimal ownership
structure. Recall that in the 2-agent case ownership did not matter. Comparing
the incentives under A-ownership (equations (21) −(23)) to those under L-
ownership (equations (30) − (32))w es e et h a tM has the same incentives in
both cases and A￿s and L￿s incentives are symmetric. Since A￿s investment is
more productive, A-ownership dominates L-ownership.
We can obtain the incentives under M-ownership by swapping subscripts
L and M in (30) − (32).A ￿s investment is the most important if and only if
ω<2. In this case A-ownership is optimal. While for ω>2 M￿s investment
is the most productive and M-ownership is optimal. Compared to the 2-agent
case L-ownership is less likely.














is clearly not true in the case we analyze, but this helps us to demonstrate how
the second force, the relative indispensability of the agents, alone aﬀects the
optimal ownership structure in the 3-agent setup. Comparing equation (23)
to (32) we see that M has worse incentives under L-ownership if and only if
λA <λ L (by Assumption 2). (22) and (30) demonstrate that L has the same
incentives under A-ownership as A has under L-ownership. Finally, from (21)
and (31) we conclude that L has worse incentives as the owner than A if and
only if λA <λ L. Therefore, A -ownership dominates L-ownership if and only if
λA <λ L. Similar comparisons with M-ownership prove that if the agents have
equally important investments, it is optimal for the most indispensable agents
to own the innovation. We use this result in the following proofs.
Now we come back to the case where either A￿s or M￿s investment is the
most productive. Suppose that the agents are not equally indispensable. We
assume that λM ≥ λL as explained in the proof of Proposition 1. If λA <λ L
and ω<2, then A-ownership is optimal ￿ as in the 2-agent case ￿ since A is
the most indispensable and the most productive agent. If λA <λ L and ω>2,
then there is a trade-oﬀ between giving the ownership to the most indispensable
agent (A) or to the most productive agent (M).
If λA >λ L, then it is optimal for either the most indispensable agent (L)
or the most productive agent (A or M) to own, while in the 2-agent case L-
ownership is optimal. Again, in the 3-agent case L-ownership is less likely.
In the benchmark the optimal ownership depends only on the relative indis-
pensability. When M joins the relative importance of investments changes in
favour of either A or M which implies that L-ownership emerges for a smaller
parameter range than in the two-agent case.
5.1.2 Additive investments














































When the investments are additive the agents bargain independently over
the two parts of the production function, f (iA,i L) and g(iA,ωi M).T h ev a l u e
f (iA,i L) is shared between A and L, which explains why f-terms in equations
(33)−(35) are multiplied by 1
2. While the bargaining over g (iA,ωi M) is between
17all three agents. A and M interact in production and L as the owner of the




When the investments are additive A￿s crucial role in production aﬀects the
bargaining outcome. A is the agent who interacts with both intermediaries while
each intermediary only interacts with the artist. This is why in the ￿rst-order
conditions under A-ownership (18) − (20) we only have 1
2 as the multiplier.
When A is both the owner and the production partner, the bargaining over
both parts of the production function is between just two agents. While if one
of the intermediaries owns the copyright, one part of the bargaining is between
three agents. A-ownership therefore tends to reduce the holdup problems when
the new intermediary is introduced.
The second force that aﬀects the ownership structure is the same as with
complementary investments: when M takes over one task from L the relative
importance of the investments changes. Depending on ω either A￿s or M￿s
investment becomes the most productive.
Proposition 6 If the investments are additive, the introduction of an interme-
diary who takes over one task from L makes L-ownership less likely.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In the two-agent setup the optimal ownership depends only on relative in-
dispensability. When M joins in two new forces are introduced: A gains a cen-
tral role in the production process and the relative importance of investments
changes in favour of either A or M. Both forces work against L-ownership and
therefore L-ownership is less likely in the three-agent case.
5.2 New intermediary creates a new task
5.2.1 Complementary investments
When the investments are complementary and M makes the project larger the


















































18The incentives are symmetric to the ￿rst order conditions under A-ownership
(equations (27) - (29)).
Now suppose that when the project becomes larger, M￿s investment is










A) for any given i0
A,i 0
L and i0
M. Then clearly the optimal owner-
ship structure depends solely on the relative indispensability of the agents ￿
just as in the two-agent case. If the new intermediary is relatively dispensable
(λM > min{λA,λ L}), then introducing the third agent does not induce a change
in the ownership of innovation. While if the nature of the service the new in-
termediary is providing is so crucial that without it A￿s and L￿s investments do
not have much value (λM < min{λA,λ L}), then it is optimal for M to act as a
venture capitalist and own the innovation.12
When M j o i n si n ,t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fi n v e s t m e n t sm a yw e l lc h a n g e
and it is not a priori clear what way. If the new task is very valuable, M￿s
investment becomes the most important. While if the new task is not very
valuable in itself but M creates value mainly through complementarities with
A (respectively L)t h e nA￿s (respectively L￿s) investment becomes the most
productive.
The two forces at work that determine the optimal ownership structure are
the relative indispensability of the agents and the relative importance of the
investments. In this case, unlike in the other cases we have analyzed, we cannot
say which way these forces move when M joins in. To be consistent with the
other cases, we state in the following proposition some suﬃcient conditions for
L-ownership to become less likely when M joins in.
Proposition 7 If the investments are complementary and M creates a new
task, L-ownership becomes less likely if:
(i) λM <λ L <λ A and the agents have equally important investments.
(ii) Either M￿s or A￿s investment is more productive than L￿s investment
and λA = λL = λM.
Proof. (i) If λM <λ L <λ A and the agents have equally important invest-
ments, then L-ownership is optimal in the two-agent case and M-ownership is
optimal in the three-agent case. Therefore M joining in makes L-ownership less
likely.
(ii) If λA = λL = λM , ownership does not matter in the two-agent case
and in the three-agent case it is optimal for the agent with the most important
investment to own the copyright. If L￿s investment is not the most productive,
then L-ownership is less likely in the three-agent case.
5.2.2 Additive Investments
The investment incentives under L-ownership are given by (33) − (35) by re-
placing f by v and g by w. We have assumed that in the benchmark production
12When M takes over task 2 from L we assumed that λM ≥ λL since M could be replaced
by the same spot-market alternative than L ￿o rb yL.W h i l ew h e nM creates a new task it
is possible that λM <λ L.
19function v(iA,i L) the investments are equally important. When M joins in the
s u r p l u si si n c r e a s e db yw(iA,i M). Since in v(iA,i L) A￿s and L￿s investments
are equally important, it must be that in v(iA,i L)+w(iA,i M) A￿s investment
is more important than L￿s investment, because A interacts with both L and
M in production. The relative importance of A￿s and M￿s investments depends
on the nature of the service the new intermediary is providing. If M￿s service is
absolutely crucial to survive in the digital age, M￿s investment is the most im-
portant. While if the two intermediaries are equally productive, A￿s investment
is the most important. This is very similar to alternative 1. When M joins in,
the relative importance of investments changes in favour of either A or M.T h e
only diﬀerence is the source of the eﬀect. In alternative 1 it depends on how
much more productive M is in task 2 than L while in alternative 2 it depends
on the value of the new service M is providing.
The analysis is similar to alternative 1. When investments are additive and
M joins in (i) t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fi n v e s t m e n t sc h a n g e si ne i t h e rA￿s or M￿s
favour and (ii) A gains a central role in production. Both forces work against
L-ownership and therefore L-ownership becomes less likely as with alternative
1. The new possibility compared to alternative 1 is that we can have λM <λ L,
i.e. the new intermediary can be more indispensable than the incumbent. This
is yet another possibility to make L-ownership less likely in the three-agent case.
Proposition 8 If investments are additive, the introduction of a new interme-
diary who creates a new task makes L-ownership less likely.
5.3 Summary
We have analyzed the eﬀect of digital technology on the allocation of copyright
in four diﬀerent cases. In three cases we show that the labels are less likely
to own copyrights when the new intermediary is introduced.13 Either artist
ownership becomes more likely or the mentor owns the innovation and acts as
a venture capitalist.
Above we have studied the optimal allocation of ownership by examining
which structure gives the highest total surplus. It is also interesting to look
at the composition of the total value. When the technology change leads to
a shift from label ownership to the artist holding the copyright, the relative
contribution of the artist increases in the total value of the piece of music. In
other words, the main element of music in the digital age is likely to be the
improved quality of the music itself, while the era of label ownership can be
described by relatively low quality music which is packaged and marketed well.
F i n a l l y ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tλL remains constant when M is introduced.
It is plausible that λL increases ￿ L becomes more replaceable ￿ because of the
new intermediary. This makes L-ownership even less likely than the results of
this section predict.
13In the fourth case the results are ambiguous.
206C o n c l u s i o n s
Our property rights analysis of the music industry in the information society
results in three main ￿ndings. Firstly, it becomes less likely that record labels
own copyrights. In the two agent case this is caused by the impact of digital
technology and the resulting loss of indispensability on the part of the label.
In the three agent environment ￿ additionally to the direct consequences of
technology change ￿ the relative importance of the investments and the bar-
gaining payoﬀs change in favour of the artist or the mentor. This makes the
label less likely to own the copyright. Secondly, it is optimal to let the third
agent (the mentor) join in when the investments are additive. Under comple-
mentary investments the mentor must be suﬃciently productive to allow him
to join in. Finally, we believe our concept of mentoring describes an interesting
and eﬃciency-improving role of an information intermediary for digital content
that has not been outlined before.
In this paper we analyze the implications of new technology on the allocation
of ownership in the music industry. The new technology opens up alternative
distribution and promotion channels to the traditional labels. In the terminol-
ogy of the property rights theory the labels become more dispensable. For a
large enough change in indispensability the optimal ownership structure shifts
from label ownership to artist ownership. For established, cash-endowed artists
acquiring ownership is feasible, while the newcomers lack the funds to compen-
sate the label ex ante. This leads to an ineﬃcient ownership structure.
We introduce an alternative arrangement where an established artist be-
comes a mentor to the newcomer. We analyze the two extremes of a non-drastic
technology change: The mentor creates a new task or he takes over one of
the label￿s traditional tasks and the label focuses on the remaining one. If the
mentor￿s and the label￿s investments are additive, including the third agent un-
ambiguously increases the value of production compared to the two agent case.
While if the mentor￿s and the label￿s investments are complementary, the men-
tor obtains holdup power over the label and the artist. Adding the third agent
reduces the value of production unless the mentor￿s investment is productive
enough to compensate for the power problems.
We compare artist and intermediary ownership to ￿nd the optimal allocation
of copyright in the three agent case. Under both complementary and additive
investments either the artist or the mentor￿s relative importance of investment
increases. The artist also assumes a crucial role in the production under addi-
tive investments which leads to a higher bargaining payoﬀ for him. Subsequently
label ownership becomes less likely. Therefore, artist ownership dominates un-
less the importance of the mentor￿s investment or his indispensability is high
enough. This would lead to mentor ownership, i.e. venture capitalism.
Our model predicts several changes for the future music industry. The role
of the mentor has already been described at length. He is a new intermediary
for digital content and ￿ if his input is essential enough ￿ he invests in the
fortunes of a new artist as a venture capitalist. Another aspect of the model
aﬀects the actual quality of music in the future. As the label ownership becomes
21less likely, the relative contribution of the artist increases and the artistic input
tends to dominate. However, label ownership is still possible if the label manages
to remain indispensable. This is particularly realistic when the artistic input
does not come from one artist alone. If the assumption of the artist being
a singer/songwriter is relaxed and we consider so-called boygroups where the
artists merely sing ￿ with the label providing the rest of the artistic inputs
(writing songs, choreography) plus the essential promotion of the band ￿ then
it becomes clearer that label ownership still has its place. Therefore, we can
distinguish between the production of music under label ownership where the
label inputs like promotion matter most and the creation of music under artist
ownership where the artistic input is essential.
The analysis will be extended to drastic changes in technology where the
label becomes obsolete. The established artist has then the option of going
independent, while the newcomer can choose to work with either the label or
the mentor.
Moreover, it is useful to think in the future how these results can shed light
on the allocation of ownership in other areas of digital content, e.g. publishing
or digital art. An interesting application of the framework might be the realm
of academic writing and publishing with researchers in academia taking the
role of the artist, traditional publishers of journals in the role of the labels and
upcoming electronic journals as the new intermediaries.
227 Appendix
To derive equations (33) − (35) we use equations (30) − (32) and take into
























































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . We ￿r s ta n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r eλA = λL = λM =
1. The incentives under A-ownership by Assumption 2 are (from equations






















































23When all the agents are dispensable the owner receives the full marginal return
to his investment while the non-owners receive half of the return to their invest-
ment at the margin. Then it is optimal for the most productive agent (A or M)
to own the innovation. In the two-agent case ownership does not matter. This
case demonstrates the ￿rst force to work against L-ownership in the three-agent
setup.
Next we analyze a case where λA = λL = λM 6=1 . Again in the two-agent
case both A-a n dL-ownership generate the same total surplus. We analyze this
case by comparing equations (33)−(35) to (18)−(20). The symmetry disappears
from the ￿rst-order conditions when the agents are not fully dispensable because
of A￿s central role in the production process. A has a stake in bargaining over
both f (iA,i L) and g(iA,ωi M) whether he is the owner of the copyright or
not, because he interacts in production with both intermediaries. If one of the
intermediaries owns the copyright, one part of the bargaining is between three
agents: the two producers and the owner. Compared to the case where all the
agents are dispensable A-ownership is optimal for higher ω. A￿s central role in
the production process is the second force to work against L-ownership in the
3-agent setup.
Finally we analyze the case where the agents diﬀer in the degree of indispens-
ability. If ω<2 and λA =m i n{λA,λ L,λ M}, A-ownership is optimal because
in addition to being the most productive agent and having a central role in the
production process A is the most indispensable agent. In other cases there is a
trade-oﬀ between giving the ownership to the most productive agent (A or M),
the most indispensable agent (A,L and M) or to the agent in central role in pro-
duction (A). In the 2-agent case L-ownership is optimal if and only if λL <λ A,
while in the 3-agent case λL <λ A is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
for L-ownership to be optimal. It is clear that L-ownership is less likely in the
3-agent setup. Q.E.D.
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